Does foreign military assistance strengthen or further weaken fragile states facing internal con ‡ict? We address this question by estimating how U.S. military aid a¤ects violence and electoral participation in Colombia. We exploit the allocation of U.S. military aid to Colombian military bases, and compare how aid a¤ects municipalities with and without bases. Using detailed political violence data, we …nd that U.S. military aid leads to di¤erential increases in attacks by paramilitaries (who collude with the military), but has no e¤ect on guerilla attacks. Aid increases also result in more paramilitary (but not guerrilla) homicides during election years. Moreover, when military aid rises, voter turnout falls more in base municipalities, especially those that are politically contested.
Introduction
Around the world, advanced countries expend vast resources with the putative goal of building capable, democratic states in developing countries. Military aid from the United States and other advanced nations exceeds all other forms of foreign aid, including development assistance. 1 From contemporary Iraq, Mexico, and Afghanistan to historical Cold War client states such as Zaire, a large amount of military assistance has been deployed in the claimed interest of shoring up weak states against insurgents, drug cartels and other armed, non-state actors. Knowing whether this foreign military assistance achieves its intended objective is thus of immediate importance to both academics and policymakers. Yet the impact of military aid on domestic political outcomes has been relatively under-studied, particularly by quantitative researchers. This paper employs micro-level data to estimate the impact of U.S. military aid on political con ‡ict in Colombia. Speci…cally, we assess how military assistance has a¤ected violence and democracy, as measured by participation in elections, over [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The Colombian civil war represents a decades old con ‡ict between left-wing guerillas, the state, and right-wing paramilitary groups, which have been known to collude with the government military in countering the guerilla. It serves as the ideal laboratory for studying this question since both of the armed non-state actors, guerillas and paramilitaries, seek territorial dominance via warfare and electoral manipulation. Moreover, over the past two decades, the United States has provided nearly $5 billion in military aid, with the stated aim of supporting counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency e¤orts. To analyze how U.S. military aid a¤ects con ‡ict dynamics, our empirical strategy takes advantage of the fact that U.S. military aid is allocated to brigades of the Colombian armed forces, which operate out of military bases located in particular municipalities. This generates within-country spatial variation in the allocation of foreign military assistance, allowing us to estimate whether annual changes in U.S. military aid a¤ect political outcomes di¤erentially in municipalities that have military bases, relative to those that do not.
The Colombian context is of general interest for scholars interested in the interplay between domestic political development and international aid. Empirical evidence from con ‡ict-ridden states such as Colombia is important because it is theoretically unclear whether an underdeveloped state is made stronger by an infusion of military or …nancial resources. While a weak state may bene…t from external military assistance if it strengthens the state's repressive capacity vis-a-vis non-state armed groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) , the very weakness of the state may also enable substantial capture and diversion of given resources (Jackson, 1990) . Via this second channel, donor countries may …nd themselves fueling the very groups that military aid is designed to suppress. The results in this paper present evidence of this form of diversion: the …ndings suggest that military and counter-narcotics aid to Colombia, rather than enhancing the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, is diverted to empower non-state armed actors, increasing both extra-legal violence and electoral manipulation, with no apparent reduction in drug production.
Our estimates display a distinct, asymmetric pattern: when U.S. military aid increases, attacks by paramilitaries, who are known to work with the military, increase more in municipalities with bases. However, there is no signi…cant e¤ect on guerilla attacks. Moreover, there is a disproportionate increase in paramilitary homicides in base regions during election years, but no equivalent increase in guerilla homicides. In addition, the aid shock has no signi…cant e¤ect on the cultivation of coca, the crop used to manufacture cocaine. In terms of electoral participation, when military aid rises, voter turnout falls more in the base municipalities, and these e¤ects are larger in municipalities that are politically contested, either militarily or electorally. The estimates imply substantial e¤ects: a 1% increase in US military assistance increases paramilitary attacks by 1.5% more in base municipalities, and lowers turnout for mayoral elections by .2% and .12% more in militarily and electorally contested regions, respectively. These results are consistent with the idea that the in ‡ux of foreign military aid enhances the capacity of paramilitary groups, both to carry out political attacks, and to intimidate voters, which reduces political participation.
To address potential endogeneity in the timing of U.S. military aid we use an instrumental variables strategy which exploits general increases in U.S. military spending around the world (excluding Latin America). The rise in global U.S. military aid re ‡ects the broad geopolitical outlook of the American government shaped by major world events such as 9/11, and can thus be considered exogenous to the Colombian con ‡ict. Since periods of high foreign aid may also be correlated with periods when the Colombian state prioritizes defense, we additionally control for the size of the Colombian government military budget and indicators of which presidential administration is in power over di¤erent sub-periods. Moreover, we are able to control for historical violence levels, to account for the possibility that base municipalities may have become ‡ashpoints in the armed struggle and display greater violence responsiveness relative to non-base municipalities.
Our results suggest that foreign aid may strengthen armed, non-state actors in an environment where there are ties between the government military and these other groups. Indeed, non-democracy and sustained civil wars have been held as a persistent legacy of superpower backing of armed groups in the Cold War era (Westad 2006 , Easterly et al. 2008 . The idea that external funding may sustain con ‡ict by …nancing armed non-state actors has relevance to several other major contemporary recipients of US military aid, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where armed militias maintain deep links to the U.S. trained and equipped military. Diversion of ammunition to non-state actors has been documented by the Small Arms Survey in a number of countries. In contemporary Afghanistan, U.S. commanders acknowledge that substantial amounts of U.S. military equipment falls into the hands of anti-U.S. insurgent groups including the Taliban.
2
Our paper is situated within the broader literature on the economic determinants of insurgency. A number of cross-country studies have found a negative relationship between GDP and the probability a nation experiences civil war, including Collier and Hoe-er, 1998 and Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al., 2004; and Fearon, 2005. 3 Several within country analyses also examine the relationship between income and violence, including Angrist and Kugler, 2008; Deininger, 2003; Barron et al., 2004; Do and Iyer, 2007; and Hidalgo et al, (forthcoming) . This literature suggests that the e¤ect of income on con ‡ict is highly heterogeneous, depending on the source and type of income. For example, Dube and Vargas (2008) …nd that rising agricultural export prices reduce violence by raising workers'wages and the opportunity costs of joining armed groups while rising natural resource prices increase violence by increasing rents available for capture. Another strand of the economic determinants literature has focused on insurgency and state capacity, particularly the provision of public goods. Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that the cross-country negative correlation between income and con ‡ict is driven by lower state capacity, in particular the state's ability to inhibit rebellion. Berman and Laitin (forthcoming) show that when the state fails to provide public goods, radical religious groups providing these social services are able to carry out more lethal forms of terrorist attacks. Berman et al. (2009) also …nd that spending on local public goods can reduce insurgency, using data from reconstruction spending in Iraq.
Foreign aid may potentially a¤ect both income and state capacity, and thus civil con ‡ict, but the direction of the e¤ect may be positive or negative. Theoretical papers focusing on the relationship between aid and con ‡ict have posited both signs. Grossman (1992) suggests that aid increases con ‡ict by expanding the rents available for capture. However, Collier and Hoe-er (2002) suggest that aid may reduce civil con ‡ict either by increasing the state's capacity to repress con ‡ict, or by encouraging economic growth and diversi…cation of income sources, which subsequently reduces con ‡ict.
Likewise, empirical assessments of the relationship between aid and con ‡ict have also found di¤erent results. Collier and Hoe-er (2007) show that aid increases military expenditures and exacerbates regional arms races between neighboring countries. However, de Ree and Nillesen (2009) …nd that increases in foreign aid decrease the likelihood of civil wars, using donor country GDP as an instrument for foreign aid to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our paper is also related to the broader cross-country literature which analyzes how foreign aid a¤ects domestic political institutions. For example, Morrison (2009) …nds that foreign aid, as a type of non-tax revenue for the state, increases political stability in both dictatorships and democracies. Wright (2009) shows that conditional aid can promote democratization in dictatorships maintained by large coalitions. Goldsmith (2001) and Dunning (2004) …nd small but signi…cant, positive e¤ects of aid on democracy in Africa. In contrast, Knack (2004) reports no signi…cant impact of foreign aid on democracy, and Djankov et al. (2008) report a negative e¤ect of aid on democracy and institutional quality, using initial income and strategic interest variables as instruments for aid. Other studies have demonstrated that aid can increase corruption (Svensson, 2000) ; the size of government (Remmer, 2004) ; and the income share of the rich (Bjornskov, 2009) , in some nations.
Most previous studies in these literatures have not distinguished between military and other types of foreign aid, and there has been little empirical analysis of how military assistance a¤ects either institutions or violence. Yet focusing speci…cally on military aid facilitates testing whether the repressive capacity channel reduces con ‡ict in a way that analyzing aggregate foreign aid does not. One exception is Finkel et al.(2009) , which …nds no signi…cant e¤ect of military aid on democracy in a panel of countries. However, the objective of the Finkel et al. study is not to identify the e¤ect of military aid, which is used as a control variable, and the estimated e¤ect cannot be interpreted in a causal manner.
Finally, our paper is also related to Acemoglu et al. (2010) , which examines the role of paramilitary groups in in ‡uencing national elections in Colombia, by assessing their e¤ect on partisan votes and electoral competition. Although the focus of our analysis is the e¤ect of external military aid on paramilitary groups, our …nding that the aid shock increases paramilitary violence and reduces electoral turnout in regional elections is consistent with evidence of electoral manipulation presented in Acemoglu et al. (2010) .
Our paper is the …rst empirical assessment of how foreign military aid a¤ects both civil war and democracy in a within-country context. The use of detailed within-country data enables us to exploit geographic variation across Colombian municipalities in terms of access to U.S. military aid, as well as variation over time in the amount of U.S. military aid. This enables cleaner identi…cation of the political consequences of foreign military assistance. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background; Section 3 describes the empirical strategy; Section 4 details the data; Section 5 presents results; and Section 6 concludes.
Background
In this section we provide background on the Colombian con ‡ict, U.S. military assistance to Colombia and the relationship between the government military and paramilitary groups.
The Colombian Civil War
The Colombian con ‡ict started in the 1960s with the launch of a communist insurgency. O¢ -cially, it is a three-sided con ‡ict among the communist guerillas, the government and right-wing paramilitary groups. However, as we document below, the paramilitaries work informally with the government in countering the guerilla. The current-day insurgency is led by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC by its Spanish acronym), whose strength at the time of the analysis was roughly 16,000-20,000 combatants, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which was estimated to have 4,000-6,000 …ghters (both have since seen their membership fall). Both groups …ght with the stated aim of overthrowing the government, but also claim to represent the rural poor by supporting policies such as land redistribution.
Although paramilitarism also dates back to the 1960s, paramilitary groups in their current form emerged during the 1980s, as private armies for drug cartels and large landowners who were targeted for extortion by the guerillas. In 1997, the disparate paramilitary groups formed an umbrella organization called the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which had roughly 30,000 …ghters at its peak strength. In 2003, the AUC declared a partial cease-…re, and some paramilitary blocks agreed to participate in a demobilization program sponsored by the Organization of American States. However, the demobilization did not e¤ectively disarm all the paramilitary units. Thus, in 2005, when the Colombian congress proposed a bill allowing extradition of paramilitaries, the AUC could credibly threaten renewed violence. 4 More generally, despite the o¢ cial demobilization, human rights groups have documented continued paramilitary violence, which in part re ‡ects the formation of a new generation of paramilitary groups, as well as renewed violence by members of pre-existing paramilitary groups.
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Although the paramilitaries and guerillas pursue kidnapping, extortion, and predation on natural resource rents, both groups rely largely on the cocaine drug trade for …nancing purposes. Thus the drug trade is inextricably linked to the dynamics of internal con ‡ict.
U.S. Aid to Colombia
Owing to its position as the world's largest producer of cocaine, Colombia has become a major recipient of U.S. military assistance over the past two decades. Throughout the 1990s it was the third largest recipient after Israel and Egypt, and today, ranks …fth in the list inclusive of Iraq and Afghanistan. Colombia started receiving more aid geared toward drug-eradication when the "War on Drugs" was initiated during the late 1980s. The 1990 "Andean Initiative" provided Colombia with a $200 million aid package intended to combat drugs, but comprised largely of resources to train and equip the Colombian military (Isaacson, 2005) . O¢ cial aid fell sharply in 1994, when President Ernesto Samper, who had a very hostile relationship with the U.S., was elected to o¢ ce in Colombia. However, with the advent of the new Pastrana administration in Colombia in 1998, the United States started developing "Plan Colombia", a $1.2 billion aid package launched in 2000. This aid package was again aimed at training and equipping the Colombian military for counter-narcotics operations, rather than pursuing counter-insurgency. However, given the guerillas involvement in the drug trade, the line between these two objectives has remained blurry, and it is impossible to distinguish the counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency components of U.S. aid. For this reason, we de…ne military aid to Colombia as the sum of these two line-items, and analyze this aggregate category throughout the paper.
One important characteristic of US military aid is that it is disbursed to particular military brigades, each of which is attached to and operates out of a particular government military base. This disbursement method serves as the basis of our identi…cation strategy, since regions with military bases receive more aid. Given the well-documented history of Colombian military human rights abuses, some jointly executed with paramilitary units, U.S. lawmakers have attempted to restrict disbursement to military units that have been recorded as committing human rights violations. In 1997 the United States Congress passed the "Leahy Amendment", which required Colombian military brigades to be vetted for human rights abuses before becoming eligible for US assistance. However, the Colombian armed forces have evaded this clause through three mechanisms: …rst, by reshu-ing individuals accused of human rights violations across brigades; second, by forming new brigades, which were subsequently vetted and "approved" by the U.S. State Department; and third, by not cooperating in handing over information about human rights violations to the U.S. government. 6 Moreover, the Plan Colombia package was speci…cally exempted from having to abide by the human rights clauses of the Leahy provision. Finally, the CONVIVIR e¤ort of 1994 created rural security cooperatives that were armed with equipment from the Colombian military (Hristov, 2009, p. 69) . However, the rapid growth in violence associated with CONVIVIR networks led to a sharp reversal of policy in 1997, when these groups were reigned in by the Judiciary, and e¤ectively declared illegal. Nonetheless, some of the CONVIVIR continued operating as illegal paramilitary groups during the 1990s, and the marriage of these networks with the private armies of the 1980s led to the paramilitary groups of the late-90s, united under the banner of the AUC. Although o¢ cial state government support was withdrawn after 1997, and the judiciary began prosecuting politicians and military o¢ cials for ties to these groups, collusion between the AUC and military continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. This is re ‡ected in the recent indictment of several high-level military o¢ cials. In 2006, General Mario Montoya, the commander (and highest ranking o¢ cer) of the Colombian army, was charged with supplying weapons to paramilitaries while stationed in a military base in Medellin. Six other high ranking members of the intelligence and armed forces were also indicted by the Colombian supreme court on suspicion of collusion with paramilitaries in 2008. This includes the former director and deputy director of the Administrative Security Department (a key security agency), as well as former army commanders and active colonels.
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Human rights organizations have documented the speci…c channels through which the Colombian army provides military and logistical support to the paramilitaries, which includes: intelligence sharing; supply of weapons and transport equipment; training; exchange of suspected guerilla sympathizers for torture and execution; assistance in paramilitary operations; and the conduct of joint operations.
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For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that military intelligence has provided paramilitaries with lists of suspected insurgents or guerrilla sympathizers, who are then threatened or killed by paramilitaries. 13 Interviews with ex-military intelligence o¢ cials suggest that the sale of military arms to paramilitaries was common. 14 Ex-paramilitaries have also described using military helicopters, and being ‡own in to military bases. The bases through which brigades operate often play a key role since proximity to the base can facilitate the military's provision of material and operational support to paramilitary groups. Since U.S. military aid is allocated to brigades operating from the bases, they represent the physical points of di¤usion for US military assistance.
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy uses the fact that U.S. military aid is allocated to brigades which are headquartered in military bases located in particular municipalities. This creates spatial variation in the allocation of U.S. military aid across municipalities. Importantly, these are longstanding military bases that precede the period of the analysis. This precludes the possibility that they have been constructed as an endogenous response to political or con ‡ict dynamics for the period of our analysis. Our empirical strategy assesses how changes in U.S. military aid a¤ect violence and electoral outcomes in regions with military bases, relative to municipalities without bases.
We implement a basic di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator, controlling for municipality and year …xed e¤ects in a linear regression. Municipality …xed e¤ects control for all time-invariant municipality characteristics that may be correlated with con ‡ict, including geographic features such as rough terrain, the presence of the base itself, and historical conditions of the municipality. Year e¤ects also control for con ‡ict levels that are common to all Colombian municipalities in a given year, including those in ‡uenced by international and national political or economic factors. Thus, we estimate:
where j are municipality …xed e¤ects and t are year …xed e¤ects. y jt are either electionsrelated variables including voter turnout, or con ‡ict related variables including the number of paramilitary attacks, government attacks, or guerilla attacks in municipality j and year t. X jt is a vector of control variables which varies across speci…cations but always includes the natural log of population, which controls for the scale e¤ect since our con ‡ict-related dependent variables are the number of attacks. Base j is a dummy variable which equals one if the municipality has a military base. USmil t is the natural log of U.S. military aid to Colombia. The coe¢ cient captures the extent to which changes in military assistance induce a di¤erential change in violence in municipalities that have bases, relative to non-base municipalities. The municipality …xed e¤ects j control for Base j and the year e¤ects t control for the overall level of U Smil t , which is why the constituent terms of the interaction do not appear separately. Equation (1) is estimated using OLS, with all standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
One concern with this empirical strategy is potential endogeneity in the timing of U.S. funding. If U.S. military assistance responds to di¤erential growth in violence across Colombian municipalities, then this could confound estimates of equation (1). This reverse causality would generate an upward bias if U.S. military aid increases more in response to violence growth in municipalities with military bases. For instance, attacks in base regions may be viewed as a strong threat to stability, and therefore galvanize more US funding relative to attacks in other regions. On the other hand, reverse causality may generate a downward bias if U.S. assistance increases more in response to violence growth in non-base regions. As an example, since reducing narcotics production is a stated U.S. objective, military aid may respond to violence increases in the largest coca producing municipalities, which are non-base municipalities.
To address this potential endogeneity, we use an instrumental variables strategy which uses changes in U.S. funding in countries outside of Latin America as an instrument for changes in U.S. funding to Colombia. Since Colombia is one of the largest recipients of U.S. anti-narcotics assistance, it is possible that the allocation of this line-item to Colombia determines the allocation of anti-narcotics assistance to other countries. To avoid this concern, we instrument the sum of anti-narcotics and military aid to Colombia solely with military aid to other nations. U.S. funding to the rest of the world is determined by the broad geopolitical outlook of the American government, re ‡ecting factors such as the party of the president or other major world events, and can thus be considered exogenous to con ‡ict dynamics in Colombia. For example, Figure 1 shows that there was a sharp increase in U.S. military assistance to countries outside of Latin America after 2001. This re ‡ects both the start of the Bush administration, and the events of 9/11, which created an impetus to provide greater funding as a part of the "war on terror." This …gure also shows that U.S. assistance to Colombia is positively correlated with military aid to non-Latin American nations. Indeed, a simple regression of these two time series con…rm that there is a signi…cant positive relationship. We present this estimate in the Supporting Information Appendix (Table A. I), which also shows that this relationship is robust to the inclusion of a linear time trend. Since our treatment is the interaction of U.S. military aid with the military base indicator, our instrument is aid to non-Latin nations interacted with the base indicator. The …rst stage is given by:
where USmilnonlac t is the log of U.S. military aid to non-Latin American countries. The second stage is given by:
We also assess whether there are di¤erential e¤ects of the aid shock during election periods. To analyze this, we estimate:
where Ele t is a dummy which equals one during the years in which elections were held in Colombia: 1988 Colombia: , 1990 Colombia: , 1991 Colombia: , 1994 Colombia: , 1997 Colombia: , 1998 Colombia: , 2000 Colombia: , 2002 Colombia: and 2003 . The coe¢ cient captures the di¤erential e¤ect of US military spending in base regions during election years relative to non-election years. The coe¢ cient # captures the di¤erential e¤ect of election periods on violence in base regions relative to non-base regions. All other two-way sub-interactions are absorbed by the municipality or year …xed e¤ects.
Data

Data Sources
Our data on civil war violence comes from the Con ‡ict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC). This dataset is event-based, and includes over 21,000 war-related episodes in over 950 municipalities from 1988 to 2005. It is collected on the basis of 25 major newspapers and supplemented by oral reports from members of Catholic social networks who track human rights violations. Since the clergy operates in every municipality of Colombia, this expands the scope of coverage of our data to remote regions that may otherwise lack media coverage. The priests are regarded as neutral actors in the con ‡ict, and often used as negotiators between the two sides. This minimizes potential over-reporting of violent events perpetuated by one side over another. The data is also cross-checked against other o¢ cial sources, including a dataset by the National Police and reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The procedure used to collect the data is described more extensively in Restrepo et al. (2004) .
The CERAC data records the number of attacks that are undertaken by each major actor in the con ‡ict, including the government, the paramilitaries, the guerillas, which are the main dependent variables of our analysis. The data is able to distinguish between unilateral attacks, which are one-sided events carried out by a particular group, versus two-sided events involving an exchange of …re among two or more groups. We use the data on clashes to develop measures of whether a municipality is contested militarily during particular years of our sample period.
We also employ a number of con ‡ict-related variables from a dataset by the Center for Study of Economic Development (CEDE), which was collected from the Observatory of Human Rights of the Vice-Presidency of Colombia. This data is based on reports from the Colombian security agency, the Administrative Department of Security. This annual level dataset gives us a measure of the number of homicides undertaken by paramilitaries and guerillas in each municipality, as well as homicides of elected o¢ cials, candidates running for o¢ ce, and community leaders, which we refer to as assassinations. It also includes a number of other measures of paramilitary and guerilla activity, including variables such as population displacement and pirating undertaken by armed groups. Finally, the CEDE data also provides detailed measures of the number of government military actions undertaken in each municipality, including rescue of kidnaps, deactivation of explosives, and seizure of arms and captives, as well as anti-narcotics operations and the dismantling of narcotics laboratories. These variables enable us to discern whether the in ‡ow of US military assistance induces greater government actions in narcotics related areas, versus other counter-insurgency areas. We de…ne our core sample based on the number of municipalities which include both the CERAC and CEDE con ‡ict data, which gives us a sample of 936 municipalities.
In addition, we analyze electoral outcomes using data from the National Registry, the o¢ cial Colombian government electoral agency. We look at local elections, including elections for mayor and town councils, (where candidates run at the municipal level), as well as for governor and the state assembly (where candidates run at the department, or state level). Municipal level data on voter turnout that is comparable across years is only available for 2000 and 2003, which is the sample for our elections results. However, we also use the aggregate vote shares for mayoral candidates in the 1997 election to classify municipalities as electorally contested in this year.
We construct an indicator of whether a municipality has a military base from two sources. First, we begin with the base locations reported in globalsecurity.org, which gives us a list of 37 municipalities with military bases. We cross-check each of these bases against information from the Colombian army, navy and airforce websites to determine which bases were newly built over our sample period. 22 We …nd three new bases, and exclude them from the sample, since it is possible that these bases were built as an endogenous response to con ‡ict dynamics.
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This leaves us with 34 municipalities with military bases, of which 32 appear in the sample for which the con ‡ict data is available. Map 1 shows the location of these bases.
We obtain data on a number of municipal level characteristics from CEDE, including time varying measures such as population, and time invariant characteristics such as the average height of the municipality. In addition, we obtain data on coca cultivation from two sources. Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes (DNE) has a measure of land used for coca cultivation in each municipality in 1994. An equivalent measure for 1999 to 2004 comes from the United Nations O¢ ce of Drug Control (UNODC), which collects this data based on satellite imagery.
Finally, we use the USAID Greenbook for data on US aid. Since much of US assistance to Colombia, including the provision of training and equipment, falls under the category of anti-narcotics assistance, we look at the combined categories of military and anti-narcotics assistance. For our instrumental variables strategy, we also use Greenbook data on military assistance in other countries outside of Latin America. In addition, we use data on development assistance to Colombia, which includes assistance provided by USAID and the Economics and Support Fund (ESF) of the State Department. Table I shows the descriptive statistics of key variables, in municipalities with and without military bases. The means indicate that paramilitary, guerilla and government attacks tend to be higher, on average, in base municipalities relative to non-base municipalities. Our identi…cation 22 The army website (last accessed 4/10/09): http://www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=69 The navy website (last accessed 4/10/09): http://www.armada.mil.co/ The air forces website (last accessed 4/10/09): http://www.fac.mil.co/?idcategoria=39l 23 These are the bases at Carepa, Tres Esquinas, and Larandia. strategy estimates whether there are di¤erential increases in base regions when US military aid increases. In contrast, the paramilitary and guerilla political assassination variables are lower in the base municipalities relative to the non-base municipalities. The empirical estimates seek to identify whether there are di¤erential increases in these outcomes in base regions during election periods, relative to non-election periods. It is worth noting that the mean paramilitary assassinations is higher than mean guerilla assassinations in both types of regions, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that paramilitary groups use this type of targeted political violence with greater frequency.
Descriptive Statistics
In terms of municipal level characteristics, the standard deviation of height, which measures ruggedness of the terrain, shows that non-base municipalities are more rugged. We consider this factor in the analysis since ruggedness has been shown to be correlated with internal con ‡ict. The indicator for whether coca was produced shows that roughly a quarter of the non-base regions and one-third of the base locales were recorded as producing coca at some point over the sample period, and the hectares of land used for cultivating coca in 2000 was even higher on average, in base regions. In addition, a higher fraction of base municipalities also either produce oil or have oil pipelines. Given these di¤erences, we interact all of these municipal characteristics with year e¤ects and employ them as time varying controls for robustness in the analysis below.
Results
U.S. Military Aid and Violence in Base Municipalities
We begin with a simple graph which captures the essence of our empirical strategy. We interact our base indicator with year dummy variables, and regress paramilitary attacks on these interaction terms, controlling for municipality and year …xed e¤ects and the log of population. In Figure 2 , we graph the coe¢ cients on the year-base interactions along with US military and narcotics aid to Colombia. The …gure shows that the coe¢ cients and aid time series move in tandem during most years. In particular, di¤erential attacks increase in 2000 when Plan Colombia was launched, fall in 2001 when military aid was scaled down and rise again in 2002 when aid started increasing. (3) show that an increase in military assistance signi…cantly increases government attacks and paramilitary attacks in base regions relative to non-base regions, but has no signi…cant e¤ect on guerilla attacks. This asymmetric e¤ect between paramilitary and guerilla attacks is one of our key …ndings. It suggests that U.S. military aid has a di¤erential e¤ect in terms of strengthening paramilitary capacity rather than guerilla capacity, and is consistent with the idea that aid channeled through the Colombian military speci…cally reaches paramilitary groups. The none¤ect on guerillas also presents evidence against the idea that aid is targeted to regions that have high overall levels of civil war violence.
The estimates imply substantial e¤ects: the coe¢ cient of .148 in column (1) suggests that a 1% increase in U.S. aid increases paramilitary attacks by approximately .0015 more in base municipalities, or by 1.5% more above the mean paramilitary attacks of .103 over the sample period. Similarly, column (2) implies that 1% more aid increases government attacks by approximately 1% more in base versus non-base areas. U.S. aid to Colombia increased by an average of 92% per year, over 1988-2005. Thus, our estimates imply an associated di¤erential increase of 138% in paramilitary attacks and 92% in government military attacks.
Armed groups may try to capture many types of local resources, so if base municipalities also receive other forms of aid, then paramilitary violence may increase because of a general rise in resources ‡owing to the region, rather than an increase in military aid per se. To test this alternative channel we undertake a falsi…cation exercise in columns (4)-(6). We analyze whether changes in U.S. development assistance a¤ect violence di¤erentially in municipalities with bases. The coe¢ cients on the interaction of the base indicator with development assistance is statistically indistinguishable from zero for all three outcome variables, which helps rule out this alternative account.
In columns (1)-(3) of Table III , we control for this type of change by including a department 25 by year …xed e¤ect, which compares only municipalities within the same department, within the same year. This sweeps out all variation at the department year level which may be correlated with both violence and military aid, such as security-related department policies or other types of aid targeted to departments. Although the coe¢ cient on the aid interaction becomes insigni…cant for the government attacks variable, it remains signi…cant for the paramilitary attack outcome, suggesting a robust e¤ect of US military aid allocation on paramilitary violence in base municipalities. The remaining columns of Table III show that our results are robust to a wide variety of controls, including linear time trends by base and non-base regions, and a post-2001 indicator variable interacted with the base variable, which allows the level e¤ect of U.S. assistance on violence in base and non-base regions to vary for the period before and after 2001. This is important since Figure 2 indicates that both US military assistance and di¤erential paramilitary attacks in base areas increased in the post-2001 era. We also control for a host of other municipal characteristics measured in the beginning of the sample period, interacted with year dummies, which accounts for any changes in violence induced by these characteristics that may also be correlated with U.S. military aid. The controls include: a 1988 urban indicator (measured as population over 10,000), since bases tend to be located in larger cities; the standard deviation of height, since ruggedness may di¤er across base and non-base regions; and coca cultivation in 2000, the year Plan Colombia was launched, since 11 of the base municipalities produce this drug crop over the sample period. 26 We also include an indicator for whether municipalities produce or transport oil, since oil is Colombia's largest export, and oil price shocks have been shown to increase violence di¤erentially in oil regions over this period (Dube and Vargas, 2008) .
In addition, we address the serious concern that bases may have been built in regions with high levels of historical violence. If these locations have become ‡ashpoints in the armed struggle, they may display greater violence responsiveness to any shock such as aid, for reasons that have little to do with resource sharing between the military and paramilitary groups. In columns (7)- (9) we control for historical violence levels from a separate data source, measured as total war-related casualties over 1975-1987 ( scaled by municipal population in the beginning of our sample period), and …nd that our main results remain unchanged.
Finally, in columns (10)-(12), we consider the alternative hypothesis that U.S. military aid strengthens the government military disproportionately in base regions, and paramilitary attacks increase there simply because paramilitary groups follow the military into regions where the government is stronger. In this case, paramilitary attacks would increase because of the structural relationship between the paramilitary and military rather than the increase in foreign military aid. To examine this alternative hypothesis, we control for the lag of government attacks. The coe¢ cients on this variable indicate that paramilitary attacks, government attacks and guerilla attacks are all higher in municipalities that had more government attacks in the previous period. This suggests that there is some persistence in con ‡ict dynamics. However, the coe¢ cient on the aid shock remains signi…cant (and does not fall in magnitude) for current period paramilitary and government attacks even when this control is included, indicating that the structural relationship does not drive the main e¤ect. 27 26 We control for coca cultivation in 2000 since this is the year in which Plan Colombia, a major anti-narcotics aid package, was launched. However, the results are robust to controlling for interactions with coca cultivation in 1994, which is the earliest year for which coca data is available. 27 Since U.S. military aid from previous periods may a¤ect current period con ‡ict, we also tested for dynamic e¤ects by interacting the base indicator with lagged U.S. military aid. These results, presented in appendix table A.II, indicate that the coe¢ cient on the lag interaction term is smaller than the coe¢ cient on the current period interaction term for paramilitary attacks, and both insigni…cant and smaller for government attacks. This sug-
Addressing endogeneity in U.S. aid allocation
If U.S. military aid increases in response to di¤erential violence in base regions, then endogeniety in the timing of U.S. military aid could also confound our e¤ects. Given the asymmetry of our main …nding (of a signi…cant e¤ect on paramilitary attacks but not on guerilla attacks), a plausible account of the reverse causality would have to explain why changes in U.S. military funding respond to di¤erential increases in paramilitary and government attacks, but not guerilla attacks. This seems counter-intuitive since the desire to achieve stability should lead U.S. military aid to respond to violence by the guerillas, who oppose the state. Nonetheless, to address this potential issue, we present results using our instrumental variables strategy in Table IV . Columns (1)- (3) show estimates of equation (3), which instruments the interaction of the base indicator and U.S. assistance to Colombia with the interaction of the base indicator with U.S. assistance to other nations outside of Latin America. Columns (4)-(6) also show the reduced form estimates. Both indicate that the results are robust to this IV strategy. In fact, comparing these coe¢ cients to those in columns (1)-(3) of Table II demonstrates that the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates. The IV coe¢ cients suggest that a 1% increase in aid translates into 3% more paramilitary attacks and 2.5% more government attacks in base municipalities versus non-base municipalities. This …nding is consistent with the idea that OLS downward biases the estimates since U.S. funding responds to di¤erential increases in violence in non-base municipalities, such as regions cultivating substantial amounts of coca.
Next, we account for the possibility that U.S. military aid allocation may be correlated with the strength of the Colombian state: if the Colombian government receives more aid when it spends more domestic resources on the con ‡ict, and concentrates …ghting e¤orts in base regions, then this could upward bias our estimates. In columns (1)-(6) of Table V , we control for (log) government military expenditures interacted with the base variable, using OLS and IV. Our main results remain unchanged. In columns (7)- (12), we control for various presidential administrations (which have di¤ered in the degree to which they prioritized defense), interacted with the bases variable. The omitted category is President Virgilio Barco of the Liberal party, who served from 1986-1990. 28 For example, the hallmark of the Uribe administration was putting greater resource toward suppressing the guerillas. However, the IV estimates are larger in magnitude after we include the administration controls, and these results indicate that most of the latter administrations witnessed relatively fewer paramilitary attacks in the base regions. These …ndings establish that our …ndings are not driven by a Uribe e¤ect.
29
gests that the contemporaneous e¤ect is more important than the lag e¤ect. Thus we use the contemporaneous interaction for the remainder of the analysis. 28 Presidents Gaviria and Samper were also of the Liberal Party, while President Pastrana (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) was from the Conservative Party. Álvaro Uribe (president from 2002-2010) is an Independent who helped establish the National Untiy Party. 29 The OLS results appear to suggest that the aid shock does not a¤ect government attacks signi…cantly when
In the Supporting Information Appendix, we show that our results are robust to three additional changes. Since we have a relatively small number treatment municipalities, we use leave-one-out estimation to show that the e¤ects are not driven by any one base. An additional table on spatial heterogeneity (A.III) addresses concerns that non-base regions may not serve as good controls for base regions by partitioning the sample in a variety of ways, including whether the municipality had a paramilitary presence in the beginning of the sample period, borders a base municipality, and is recorded as growing coca. In Table A .IV, we also improve the control set by presenting three "matching" estimators, where base and non-base municipalities are matched on population, municipal spending, area, altitude, secondary schooling, and coca cultivation. Both tables con…rm that the results are robust to these alternative control sets.
Aid, Military Operations and Coca Cultivation
The long-standing stated aim of US military assistance to Colombia has been promoting counter-narcotics e¤orts and lowering drug crop production. However, after 2001, the U.S. government authorized the use of military assistance toward counter-insurgency ends in this country. To investigate what types of activity U.S. aid in ‡uences, in Table VI , we analyze the e¤ect of the aid shock on di¤erent types of operations undertaken by the Colombian military, as well as overall levels of municipal coca cultivation. Because we look at the coca outcome, we restrict the sample to the set of municipal year observations for which the coca variable is available, but the results do not change if we analyze the military operations for the full sample. In columns (1)-(3), we look at counter-insurgency operations, including the number of armed group captives taken by the Colombian military, the number of weapons seized (which includes recaptured arms and deactivated explosives), and the number of kidnap victims rescued and freed from the illegal armed groups. The coe¢ cient on our treatment variable is signi…cant and positive for all of these variables, indicating that an increase in US aid di¤erentially increases the number of counter-insurgency operations undertaken in military base municipalities. The e¤ects imply that a 1% increase in U.S. aid increases captives taken by .9%, increases arms seizures by 1% and increases freed and rescued kidnaps by .7% more in base regions.
In columns (4)- (5) of Table VI , we analyze municipal coca cultivation and the number of counter-narcotics operations undertaken by the Colombian military. For the coca outcome, the military expenditure is accounted for, and doesn't signi…cantly a¤ect any of the dependent variables when the administration dummies are included. However, this is likely to re ‡ect overcontrolling, since U.S. military aid is likely to vary with idiosyncratic relationships among various Colombian presidents and the United States, and controlling for unrestricted presidential e¤ects eliminates a lot of this variation in aid. If presidents are also pursuing distinct base-speci…c counterinsurgency strategies that a¤ect only paramilitary groups, then including the presidential controls would confound the OLS estimates. However, the robustness of our estimates to the IV strategy assures us that this potential source of bias does not invalidate our account; endogenous time-varying U.S. military aid is exactly the kind of problem that the IV estimate solves. coe¢ cient on the aid interaction is close to zero and statistically insigni…cant, which suggests that aid does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on drug crop production in the base regions. Moreover, this coe¢ cient is negative and signi…cant for the anti-narcotics operations, and substantial in magnitude: a 1% increase in aid implies that anti-narcotics operations fall by 2% more in base municipalities. In other words, when US military aid increases, there is a decrease in counternarcotics operations in base regions relative to non-base areas. One interpretation of this e¤ect is that it re ‡ects a shift from counter-narcotics to counter-insurgency in the use of U.S. military aid. Since most coca may not be cultivated in municipalities with military bases, in columns (6), we re-analyze the anti-narcotics operations for the set of municipalities that have been known to produce coca at some point, which includes 11 military base municipalities. The results remain e¤ectively unchanged with this sample restriction.
Aid, Assassinations and Electoral Participation
Tables II-V have shown that allocation of U.S. aid through Colombian military bases has no signi…cant e¤ect on guerilla attacks but leads to signi…cant increases in paramilitary attacks. To see if this rising violence is consistent with the political goals of the armed groups, we next analyze whether the aid shock has di¤erential e¤ects on paramilitary and guerilla violence during election periods. We analyze total homicides undertaken by various armed groups, and look speci…cally at political assassinations, a sub-category that includes the killing of elected o¢ cials, candidates and community leaders, and thus re ‡ects political targeting.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table VII presents estimates of equation (4) for total homicides. Column 1 shows that, while the military aid shock has no signi…cant e¤ect on homicides during non-election years, it leads to a signi…cant di¤erential increase on homicides conducted by paramilitaries in election years relative to non-election years. Adding the coe¢ cients together in the …rst two rows gives the total e¤ect of the aid shock in election years. While positive, the noisiness of the coe¢ cient in the second row does not allow us to rule out a zero e¤ect of the aid shock on total paramilitary homicides in election years in the OLS estimates. However, when IV is used in column 3, the e¤ect is positive, signi…cant, and much larger, indicating that the aid shock leads to signi…cant increases in homicides during election years. As in previous tables, there is no e¤ect on homicides committed by guerillas, either in election or non-election years.
The second panel of Table VII looks speci…cally at assassinations. Once again the positive estimate of , the coe¢ cient on the three-way interaction in the …rst row, indicates that there is a di¤erential e¤ect of the aid shock on paramilitary assassinations in election years, relative to non-election years. However, the estimate of (in the second row) indicates the aid shock has a negative e¤ect on assassinations in non-election years. Moreover, the sum of the estimates of and is also negative, indicating a negative e¤ect of the aid shock on assassinations in election years. In other words, the aid shock reduces paramilitary political assassinations, but this reduction is smaller during election periods, relative to non-election periods.
Overall, these results suggest that the in ‡ux of U.S. military aid has a composition e¤ect on the type of violence employed by paramilitary groups. During election periods, there is an increase in total paramilitary homicides, but a substitution away from assassinations, which are the highest pro…le killings. In other words, the "security e¤ect" of U.S. aid may reduce the incentives to pursue assassinations, so that there are in fact fewer targeted killings of political leaders in base municipalities when U.S. aid rises. However, while U.S. aid induces a substitution away from assassinations, this e¤ect is attenuated during election years, when the net political returns to violence against candidates and politicians is arguably highest. Columns 6 and 8 show that once again, there is no di¤erential e¤ect on guerilla assassinations during election periods. This suggests that to the extent that U.S. aid induces a composition e¤ect on the nature of homicides, it exerts this in ‡uence solely on paramilitaries, not on guerrillas.
The signi…cant increases in paramilitary homicides and assassinations during election periods is consistent with the idea that U.S. aid allocation strengthens paramilitary capacity to carry out politically targeted attacks. Additional resources may also strengthen the ability of paramilitary groups to pursue their electoral agenda. To examine this hypothesis, we analyze whether aid allocation through military bases also a¤ects participation in local elections, since intimidating voters is a third dimension of paramilitary capacity. While we would ideally have data on which local parties were pro-paramilitary, and estimate the e¤ect on those parties'vote shares, we do not have this information at the local level. Thus, we focus on voter turnout, and assess whether changes in US military assistance a¤ect turnout di¤erentially in municipalities with military bases, estimating equation (1) with log of total votes cast in the election as the outcome variable.
Table VIII presents the estimates on the aid interaction for the four local elections: gubernatorial elections and state elections, which take place at the department level, and mayoral elections and town council elections, which take place at the municipal level. Voter turnout data for local elections that is comparable across years is only available for the post-2000 period. This restricts our analysis to the years 2000 and 2003. Columns (1)- (4) show that the coe¢ cients on the aid interaction is negative and signi…cant, which suggests that an increase in US military aid di¤erentially lowers turnout in base regions, for all four elections. These coe¢ cients are elasticities and imply that a 1% increase in aid reduces turnout by .09% for the governors and state assembly elections, and by .05% and .08% for the mayor and town council elections.
If reduced turnout re ‡ects intimidation of voters by armed groups, we should see larger e¤ects in contested regions, where the returns to reducing turnout will be larger. To explore this idea, we examine whether the e¤ects are larger in municipalities that were either electorally contested or militarily contested. 30 We classify a municipality as militarily contested if it experienced clashes between the guerillas and the government or the guerillas and the paramilitary during each of the years over 1995-1997. 31 Column (5)- (12) of Table VIII show the e¤ect of the aid shock on turnout in the militarily contested regions, and the uncontested regions. The results indicate that the aid interaction has a substantial negative e¤ect on voter turnout in all 4 types of elections held in contested regions, and that these coe¢ cients are much larger than the average e¤ect for the full sample. For example, a 1% increase in foreign aid is predicted to reduce turnout for gubernatorial elections by .3% and for mayoral elections by .2%. In contrast, the treatment has no signi…cant e¤ect on gubernatorial and mayoral election turnout in the uncontested regions. There is a signi…cant reduction in turnout for state assembly and town council elections, but the magnitude of the coe¢ cients are about half relative to those in the contested sample. In Table IX , we partition the sample along lines of electoral contestation, based on whether an election was close in the previous (1997) regional election. A close election is de…ned as one in which the vote di¤erence between the top two candidates was less than 5 percent. For our sample, it is meaningful to think of close elections only for the mayoral race.
32 Columns (1)- (3) show the results for the e¤ect on turnout in these municipalities. Column (1) includes all 155 electorally contested municipalities; column (2) subdivides further and looks at just the 11 municipalities that were both electorally and militarily contested; and column (3) looks at the 288 electorally contested municipalities that were not militarily contested. The coe¢ cient is negative and signi…cant in all three speci…cations, and all three coe¢ cients are larger relative to those from the full sample (in Table VIII ), which establishes that the aid shock reduces turnout more in contested regions. However, the coe¢ cient is largest for the municipalities that are contested along both dimensions (in the second column).
33 30 There are two reasons why the e¤ect may also be larger in militarily contested regions. First, a municipality may be militarily contested because there are large potential gains from control over this area. (For example, it might be located in a strategic corridor or be endowed with resources that can help …nance armed activity). In this case, the armed group has larger expected gains from having an allied candidate in o¢ ce. Alternatively, a municipality may be militarily contested if underlying preferences are polarized -i.e., it is a municipality where both the guerillas and the paramilitaries receive support from some fraction of the local population. In this case, military contestation should be strongly correlated with electoral contestation, and the higher marginal expected return from reducing turnout could motivate targeting of these regions. 31 We choose the 1995-1997 period since our election sample begins in 2000, and the previous election took place in 1997. We avoid using a later interval since these clashes may be undertaken in anticipation of the elections in 2000. However, our results are insensitive to the choice of time period, and we get similar e¤ects if we de…ne contestation over 1997-1999. 32 Multiple candidates are elected to both the state assembly and town council elections, and a close gubernatorial election is de…ned at the department level, while we analyze turnout at the municipal level.
33 It is also worth noting that out of 56 militarily contested municipalities, and 155 electorally contested municipalities, only 11 appear in both groups. Indeed, the raw correlation coe¢ cient between these two measures of contestation is actually negative. This provides suggestive evidence that municipalities are militarily contested Columns (4)-(6) of Table IX show the equivalent speci…cations for the non-contested municipalities. The coe¢ cient on the aid interaction is insigni…cant in all three speci…cations, indicating that there is di¤erential targeting of regions that are electorally contested. It is worth noting that the coe¢ cient is close to zero (-.002) in column (6), which is the sub-sample of municipalities that are neither electorally nor militarily contested. In contrast, the coe¢ cient is much larger (.1), albeit insigni…cant, in column (5), which is restricted to the set of militarily contested municipalities which were not electorally contested. This pattern suggests that both electoral and military contestation matter, but electoral contestation plays a particularly important role in determining the extent to which a rise in U.S. military aid is associated with lower electoral participation in base municipalities.
Conclusion
Although advanced countries transfer substantial resources to developing countries in the form of military assistance, little empirical work has evaluated the impact of military aid. This paper has estimated the e¤ect of U.S. military assistance on con ‡ict and electoral participation in Colombia, a country torn apart by civil war over the past four decades. We exploit the channeling of U.S. aid to army brigades, which are headquartered at bases in particular municipalities, to obtain within-country spatial variation in the allocation of military assistance. Using highly disaggregated con ‡ict data from 1988-2005, we …nd that increases in U.S. military aid increased attacks by paramilitary groups di¤erentially in municipalities containing military bases. In contrast, we …nd no signi…cant e¤ect on guerilla attacks. We interpret this …nd-ing as consistent with the well-documented collusion that takes place between the Colombian military and paramilitaries in …ghting the guerillas. These results are robust to speci…cations, sub-samples, and an instrumental variables strategy based on worldwide increases in U.S. military aid (outside of Latin America). The coe¢ cient estimates imply that the average annual increase of 92% in U.S. military aid to Colombia is associated with 138% more paramilitary attacks per year in base regions, relative to non-base regions during this period.
Turning to the implications for Colombian politics, we …rst document that there are more paramilitary homicides during election periods when U.S. military aid is high in base regions, and that this aid shock leads to di¤erential paramilitary assassinations of politicians and community leaders in election periods relative to non-election periods. As before, we …nd no corresponding increase in guerilla political assassinations. We also …nd that voter turnout falls more in base municipalities when U.S. military assistance rises, which we interpret as a consequence for reasons beyond the underlying preferences of the population, and that military contestation is based on factors that di¤er from electoral contestation. of increased paramilitary capacity to intimidate voters and reduce electoral participation. Consistent with this interpretation, the fall in turnout is larger in base municipalities that were previously contested either militarily or electorally, which are the regions where armed actors bene…t the most from having an allied elected o¢ cial, or where the return from intimidating voters is greatest for achieving political control.
Though we focus on Colombia, our results speak to broad questions in political development and international assistance. Military aid is sometimes proposed as a cure for the weak state, as it is presumed to enhance the government's repressive capacity, and facilitate its ability to secure a "monopoly on the legitimate use of violence." Yet our results suggest that, in environments such as Colombia, where there is collusion between the military and illegal armed groups, international military assistance can strengthen armed non-state actors, who rival the government over the use of violence. Our …ndings also document a channel through which foreign military aid can undermine formal democratic institutions, namely, by equipping organizations that use violence to manipulate elections.
The analysis in this paper holds a clear policy implication: it suggests that advanced nations should consider the informal links between the armed forces and illegal armed groups prior to deploying military aid to other con ‡ict-torn societies, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Mexico, or Indonesia. In these nations, similar collusion between the military and informal armed militias have led to the use of foreign military resources by illegitimate armed groups, and sometimes been accompanied by severe human rights abuses. Massacres in East Timor preceding the 1999 referendum on independence from Indonesia were led by militias tightly connected to the Indonesian military, which has been a large recipient of U.S. military assistance. In contemporary Iraq, informal Shiite militias conduct joint operations with the U.S. backed Iraqi army against suspected insurgents, despite accusations of torture and other human rights violations. The United States is currently contemplating a large increase in military aid to Mexico to assist in combating the well-armed private armies of drug cartels. However, a 2000 Global Exchange report notes that "the Mexican army has been in…ltrated by narcotics tra¢ ckers at the highest ranks, and is increasingly dependent on U.S. weapons, training, and ideology (p. 46)." Taking account of the relationship between the state's armed forces and non-state armed groups could thus be an important pre-requisite for the e¤ective deployment of military aid. Notes. Variables not shown include municipality and year fixed effects and log of population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level. 
Table III US Military Aid and Violence: OLS Estimates with Controls
Notes. Variables not shown include municipality and year fixed effects and log of population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. Columns 1-3 include department X year fixed effects. Columns 4-6 include a separate trend as well as a differential post-2001 level for base municipalities. Columns 7-9 include time-varying effects of historical violence measured as the sum of total casualties 1975-1987 scaled population in 1988, as well as time-varying effects of 1988 urbanization, coca production, oil, and the standard deviation of height. Columns 10-12 include lag government attacks. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level.
(1) Notes. Variables not shown include municipality and year fixed effects and log of population. In columns 1-3 Log US Military Aid X Base is instrumented by Log US All Non Latin American Military Aid X Base. Columns 4-6 show the reduced form OLS regressions of Log US All Non Latin American Military Aid X Base on outcome variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level.
Instrumental Variables Estimates
Reduced Form Estimates Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level. Table VI Notes. Variables not shown include municipality and year fixed effects and log of population. Coca years sample refers to years in which there is data on coca production :1994, 2000-2005. Coca region refers to municipalities that were recorded as having grown coca at any point in the sample period. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. Variables discussed in the text. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level.
(1) Notes . Variables not shown include municipality and year fixed effects and log of population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable in 1-4 are homicides, and in 5-8 are homicides of candidates, elected officials and community leaders carried out by paramilitaries and guerrillas. In columns 3-4 and 7-8 Log US Military Aid X Base is instrumented by Log US All Non Latin American Military Aid X Base, and Log US Military Aid X Base X Election Year is instrumented by Log US All Non Latin American Military Aid X Base X Election Year. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level.
Table VII US Military Aid, Homicides and Assassinations
Sample: 
All
Notes. Dependent variable is log of votes cast in each election. Variables not shown include municipality and year fixed effects and log of population. Columns 5-8 restrict the sample to militarily contested municipalities, and columns 9-12 restrict the sample to non-militarily contested municipalities. Column headers refer to type of election. Sample years are 2000 and 2003, when regional elections are held. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 4 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Our analysis uses a relatively small number of treatments regions (since 32 out of 936 municipalities have military bases). This raises concerns that the results may potentially be biased by an outlying treatment observation. To test the sensitivity of our estimates to individual municipalities, we re-estimate equation (1) 32 times, leaving out one of our base municipalities each time. This gives us 32 coe¢ cients, the mean of which is .147. (The minimum is .111 and the maximum is.166). Figure A. 1 gives the density of the T-scores of each of these regressions, which shows that the lowest T-score is 2.1, and that the coe¢ cient is signi…cant at the 95% level, regardless of which individual base municipality is excluded. 
US Military Aid and Voter Turnout: OLS Estimates
Accounting for Spatial Heterogeneity
Our empirical strategy compares changes in violence in municipalities with and without bases as US funding changes, and therefore presumes that the regions without bases serve as good controls for regions with bases. However, if regions with and without military bases di¤er from one another in terms of characteristics that determine con ‡ict responsiveness, this spatial heterogeneity may confound our estimates.
In Table A .III, we attempt to improve the set of control municipalities by partitioning the sample in di¤erent ways. We present these results for just paramilitary and government attacks, since the aid interaction remains insigni…cant in all speci…cations where guerilla attacks is the dependent variable. In columns (1)- (2), we restrict the sample to municipalities which had a paramilitary presence in the beginning of the sample period, de…ned as whether the municipality experienced any type of paramilitary activity in each of the …rst three years between 1988 and 1990. Activity is not just limited to paramilitary attacks, but additionally includes events such as population displacement, kidnaps, blocked transport routes, and pirating or theft undertaken by paramilitary groups. We choose the three year window because activity in any one year may re ‡ect a transitory or idiosyncratic incursion, but sustained activity over a three year period is a better indicator of persistent or more endemic paramilitary presence.
This restriction creates a subset of 224 municipalities (out of 936 in the baseline sample), and includes 22 of the 32 treatment regions with military bases. The coe¢ cients on the aid interaction remain positive and signi…cant for both paramilitary and government attacks, and insigni…cant for guerilla attacks, even when we restrict attention to this more comparable subset. In columns (3)-(4), we look at the regions without paramilitary presence in early years. The insigni…cant coe¢ cient on paramilitary attacks may re ‡ect the fact that regions without a paramilitary presence in the beginning of the sample period continue to have low paramilitary presence throughout the sample period.
2 Alternatively, it may also re ‡ect low power in treatment (as only 10 base municipalities are included in the sub-sample without a paramilitary presence). Next, we partition the sample based on municipalities that do and do not border the municipalities with bases. If military bases have been constructed in strategic regions that are particularly responsive to violence, this raises the concern that overall increases in con ‡ict correlated with US military spending may have resulted in greater violence in these ‡ashpoints for reasons unrelated to the aid per se. From this angle, bordering municipalities may make for better controls in the sense that they are more likely to share the strategic municipal characteristics. As shown in columns (5)- (6), when restricted to the 210 neighboring municipalities, the coe¢ cients on the aid interaction remain unchanged for both the paramilitary and government attack outcome variables. (For example, the estimated coe¢ cient was .148 for the paramilitary attacks outcome in the baseline speci…cation in Table II , and the equivalent coe¢ cient is .133 in column (6) of Table A.III) .
On the other hand, restricting attention to border regions also makes it more likely that increases in paramilitary activity in the base municipality arises from substitution away from non-base municipalities, since its less costly to relocate armed activity away from nearby regions. To explore this idea, in columns (7)-(8), we remove the neighboring regions from the control set. Again, the coe¢ cients on the aid interaction e¤ectively remain unchanged: for the paramilitary attacks outcome, the coe¢ cient is .145. This suggests that the e¤ect is not driven by substitution or a substantial lowering of paramilitary violence in the control regions. In addition, suggestive time series evidence indicates that at the annual level, as U.S. military aid increases, paramilitary attacks also increase. We show this simple regression in column (4) of Table A .I, and the signi…cant coe¢ cient con…rms that there are net annual increases in attacks in years when funding increases. This suggests that even if the positive coe¢ cient on the treatment interaction arises in part from substitution, the entire e¤ect is not based on a simple re-allocation of paramilitary attacks from control to treatment regions. Finally, we partition the sample into regions with and without coca production in columns (9)-(12) of A.II. Given its stated anti-narcotics objective, U.S. military spending may have a di¤erential e¤ect on con ‡ict in coca regions relative to non-coca regions. If military bases are located in regions cultivating coca, then it would be di¢ cult to distinguish the e¤ect of aid on violence that arises from the presence of a base, relative to the presence of drug crops. Indeed, 11 of the 32 bases are located in municipalities that have been recorded as producing coca. However, when we partition the sample, we …nd that the coe¢ cient on the aid interaction remains highly signi…cant for paramilitary and government attacks in the set of 684 municipalities that were recorded as never having produced coca over the sample period. This shows that the e¤ect of US military aid on paramilitary violence does not arise solely though a coca-related channel. In contrast, the aid interaction becomes marginally insigni…cant for paramilitary attacks in the set of 252 municipalities that were recorded as having produced coca during at least one year of the sample. In addition, the coe¢ cient for the aid interaction on government attacks becomes insigni…cant and falls sharply in magnitude in the coca sample relative to the non-coca sample. Since aid continues to exert an e¤ect on paramilitary attacks but not government attacks in the coca region, one interpretation is that the military outsources more of its counter-insurgency e¤orts to paramilitaries in the drug crop regions, where the rule of law may be weaker, or where state capacity may be lower.
Matched Estimates
In Table A .IV, we improve the control set for base regions in a second way, by presenting three "matching" estimators. First, we estimate a cross sectional probit regression of the probability of being a base on …xed municipality characteristics, and obtain predicted propensity scores for the full sample. 4 In columns (1)- (2), we estimate equation (1) ; restricting the sample to control municipalities with propensity scores at least as large as the smallest propensity score of the base municipalities, i.e., the common support of treatment and control units. In columns (3)- (4), we employ the full sample, but weight the regressions by the propensity score. 5 In columns (5)- (6), we restrict the sample to control municipalities that are matched to the base municipalities by a 50-nearest neighbor match. The large number of neighbors is required to obtain balance on all the interactions and quadratics. The coe¢ cient of interest remains signi…cant at least the 10% level across all matching estimates, even when the matching procedure reduces the sample substantially. The results provide robust evidence that the in ‡ux of U.S. military aid into base regions has no signi…cant e¤ect on guerilla attacks, but result in di¤erential increases in paramilitary attacks.
Time-Series Estimate
(1) Notes. Columns 1-3 show the time series relationship between U.S. military aid to Colombia and U.S. military aid to non-Latin countries, which is the time variation in the first stage of the IV estimates. Column 4 estimates the simple time series relationship between U.S. military aid to Colombia and paramilitary attacks at the annual level. Columns 5 and 6 show panel level estimates of the relationship between U.S. military aid to Colombia and paramilitary attacks separately in non-base and base municipalities. These specifications include population and municipality and year FE and show robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level. Notes. Variables not shown include municipality and year fixed effects and log of population. The second row shows coefficient estimates of the interaction of base with US military aid lagged by one year. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level. 
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